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Abstract Using a principal-agent setting, we introduce honesty that requires pre-
commitment. The principal offers a menu of mechanisms to screen ethics. Agents
may misrepresent ethics. Dishonest agents may misrepresent the match with the
assigned task (good or bad), while honest agents reveal the match honestly if
they have pre-committed. Ethics-screening, that allows for match-screening with
dishonest agents while leaving a lower rent to honest agents, is optimal if both hon-
esty and a good match are likely. Otherwise the optimal mechanism is the standard
second-best or the first-best (where dishonest agents misrepresent the match), if
dishonesty is likely or unlikely respectively.
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1 Introduction
For the past 30 years, a large body of literature has developed on the theme that
individuals use their private information in an opportunistic manner. However,
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evidence suggests that some individuals behave honestly even if they thereby forgo
material benefits. For instance, using data from a firm that kept monitoring at a high
level while making the employees believe that it had been relaxed, Nagin, Rebitzer,
Sanders and Taylor (2002) found that only some employees chose to increase the
extent of shirking.1 Some authors have introduced such an heterogeneity in eth-
ics in various contexts. In Jaffee and Russell (1976), banks may ration credit if
borrowers differ in their willingness to default on loans. Assuming that some tax-
payers report their income truthfully regardless of economic incentives, Erard and
Feinstein (1994) are able to rule out unrealistic equilibria.2 Analyzing various eco-
nomic settings, Tirole (1992), Kofman and Lawarrée (1996), and Alger and Ma
(2003) find that it is suboptimal to deter collusion if potential dishonesty is suffi-
ciently unlikely. Among these papers, only Alger and Ma allow for screening the
agent’s ethics. In this paper and our companion work, Alger and Renault (2006), we
address this question in the canonical principal-agent model with adverse selection
and look at the implications of different specifications of an honest behavior.
We consider a model where a principal contracts over a decision (e.g., output)
and a transfer (e.g., a wage) with an agent, whose match with the principal may
be either good or bad. Moreover, the agent may be either opportunistic or honest,
where an honest agent reveals the match even if he is not given proper incen-
tives. The principal observes neither the agent’s ethics, nor his match. If honesty
involves revealing any private information at no cost, the principal screens ethics
perfectly: she may screen matches whether the agent is honest or dishonest, while
only handing out an informational rent to a dishonest agent. This has been shown
by Deneckere and Severinov (2001, 2003), who characterize the optimal contract
in a related setting with a continuum of matches. By contrast if, like in the early
literature, the principal could only resort to contracts where the set of messages
is the set of matches, then in the optimal contract the principal either leaves as
much rent to an honest and a dishonest agent, or gives up screening matches for a
dishonest agent.3
These two polar cases illustrate the potential benefits from screening ethics.
However, assuming that an honest agent unconditionally reveals any private infor-
mation at no cost does not receive much support from research in psychology.
Hartshorne and May (1928, p. 385) laid out what is still the basic tenet for much
of this literature, namely, that moral behavior cannot be viewed as emanating from
“an inner entity operating independently of the situations in which the individuals
are placed”. Instead, the general perception is that behavior is conditional on vari-
ous factors; in particular, studies have shown that such concerns as financial needs,
the fear of getting caught, perceived equity, and loyalty all affect the propensity
to behave honestly (see, e.g., Spicer and Becker 1980; Terris and Jones 1982), all
of which would translate differently into a formal model. In our companion paper,
we focus on honesty as being conditional on the perceived equity of the contract.
In this paper, we instead look at loyalty as a trigger of honest behavior.
1 See the references in Alger and Ma (2003) and Alger and Renault (2006) for further examples.
2 See Picard (1996) for an equilibrium analysis of insurance markets with heterogeneous ethics.
3 Strictly speaking this is true in general only when there are two match realizations; if there
are more than two the principal may leave less rent to an honest agent while only partially giving
up match screening for a dishonest.
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The following two examples illustrate situations where a sense of loyalty may
lead an agent to follow the prescriptions of some explicit or implicit contract. In
subcontracting situations, such as with plumbers and carpenters, there frequently
is ex ante uncertainty pertaining to the cost of the assignment. Typically the sub-
contractor would learn the relevant information while completing the job, whereas
the customer would remain uninformed. A prior discussion of these uncertainties
with the house owner might prevent some subcontractors from inflating the cost.
In the workplace, an employee may discover how well he is matched with a given
task only in the course of performing it: either because of unforeseen contingen-
cies, or because he has never performed this task before. This may for instance
result in different times needed to achieve a given output. In this case an honest
employee would reveal this information if he has committed to doing so by signing
a pre-specified contract with the employer.
In their work on commitment in the workplace, Meyer and Allen (1991) dis-
tinguish between three kinds of commitment: “Affective commitment refers to the
employee’s emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the
organization. (...) Continuance commitment refers to an awareness of the costs asso-
ciated with leaving the organization. (...) Finally, normative commitment reflects
a feeling of obligation to continue employment” (p. 67). In their 1997 book, they
devote a chapter to understanding how commitment towards an organization devel-
ops. Existing research indicates that individuals vary in their propensity to become
committed, but that “relations between demographic variables and affective com-
mitment are neither strong nor consistent” (Meyer and Allen 1997, p. 43). Instead,
the degree of affective commitment depends to a large extent on organizational fea-
tures, such as fairness and supportiveness, as well as work experiences (more or less
pleasant experiences with supervisors and co-workers, the degree of challenge, the
variety of skills required, etc.). These findings thus suggest that commitment may
be important for some individuals only, that an employee’s sense of commitment
develops after being hired, and that there seems to be no clear relation between
commitment and observable differences such as gender or age. Meyer and Allen
(1997, pp. 26–35) further report evidence pointing to a link between an employee’s
sense of commitment and his honesty (or lack of willingness to shirk); numerous
studies have shown that an employee’s degree of commitment to the firm is (a)
negatively correlated with his/her likelihood of “voluntary absence” (absenteeism
due to reasons that were under the employee’s own control), and (b) positively
correlated with his job performance.
We use these insights to formalize honesty in a two-period principal-agent set-
ting. The agent discovers his match in the second period. However, he knows his
ethics in the first period: for instance he knows whether or not he will develop a
strong sense of commitment in the second period. An honest agent would reveal his
match truthfully provided that he has signed a contract specifying which allocation
should be implemented as a function of the true match, i.e., a direct mechanism.
Any contract specifying more than one message pertaining to a specific match,
or using messages pertaining to no true match realization, would be perceived as
attempts by the principal to manipulate the honest agent. In the first period the prin-
cipal may offer a menu of contracts in order to screen ethics. Because the agent
has not yet developed a sense of commitment in the first period, he is willing to
misrepresent his ethics, should that give him a higher expected surplus.
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This setup differs from that of Alger and Renault (2006) and Deneckere and
Severinov (2001) where an honest agent behaves honestly even if the contract spec-
ifies more allocations than there are match realizations. However, we allow for an
ex ante screening of ethics by letting the principal offer a menu of contracts before
the match realization is known to the agent; in the early literature involving ethics
heterogeneity the principal was restricted to offering only one contract specifying
a unique allocation for each match realization.
The principal would ideally choose to leave no rent to an honest agent, while
leaving a rent to an opportunistic agent in order to screen matches. But since an
honest agent is willing to lie about his ethics, inducing truthful revelation of the
match by an opportunistic agent requires leaving as large a rent for an honest as
for an opportunistic agent. The only way for the principal to leave a smaller rent to
an honest agent is to allow for misrepresentation of the match by an opportunistic
agent. This means that the revelation principle does not apply. This failure of the
revelation principle, that was a key feature of the literature where ethics screen-
ing was ruled out, arises despite the potential for screening ethics in the present
framework. In fact, we find that the no-screening constraint that was exogenously
imposed in that literature may emerge as a property of the optimal mechanism.
Then the contract is as if the agent were dishonest with certainty if dishonesty
is sufficiently likely, so that the standard analysis is robust to the introduction of
honest agents. Otherwise, the contract is as if the agent were honest with certainty,
i.e., as if information were complete. In this case, a dishonest agent always claims
that the match is bad, which results in an inefficient allocation when the match is
actually good: in this sense there is a distortion at the top, in contrast with standard
results.
Without ethics screening, the principal is led to choose between screening
matches for the dishonest and leaving no rent to the honest. We show that there
exists an alternative contract involving ethics screening that enables the principal
to screen matches for the dishonest, while leaving a lower rent to an honest than
to a dishonest. This is achieved by inducing the dishonest to systematically mis-
represent the match, and by exploiting the fact that the honest is not willing to
misrepresent the match should he choose the contract meant for the opportunistic
agent. Clearly, if the probability that the agent is dishonest is above one half, the
principal would like to do the reverse, namely, give a smaller rent to the dishonest.
However, this is impossible since the dishonest agent is unrestrained in his will-
ingness to misrepresent the match. As a result, ethics screening is only used when
the agent is more likely to be honest than dishonest. It follows that the standard
analysis, where there are no honest agents, is robust to the introduction of honest
agents.
Whether or not ethics screening is used when honesty is likely depends on how
it compares to the contract where the principal does not screen matches for the
dishonest. The latter contract involves a cost for the principal only in the event that
the match is good, because the allocation for the dishonest is then distorted. By
contrast the cost of ethics screening is to leave a rent to the honest. We find that
ethics screening dominates the complete information contract when the probabil-
ity of a good match is sufficiently large. Only then does the benefit from match
screening for the opportunistic outweigh the cost of leaving a rent to the honest.
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The next section introduces the formal model. In Section 3, we characterize
the optimal contract, and contrast results with those of Alger and Ma (2003) and
Alger and Renault (2006), and we conclude in Section 4. Proofs are in Appendix.
2 The model
We model an honest behavior triggered by a commitment to reveal some private
information. To this end we consider a two-period framework where a contract
is signed in period 1 before some piece of private information (the “match”) is
revealed to the agent.
Although our model applies to many situations, we specify it to suit the
employer–employee relationship. An employer (the principal) hires an individual
(the agent) to perform a task with output x . This output gives the principal sur-
plus π(x), where π is a strictly increasing and concave function, with π(0) = 0,
π ′(0) = +∞, and limx→+∞ π ′(x) = 0. The principal pays the agent a transfer t ,
so that her net surplus is (x, t) = π(x) − t .
There is uncertainty as to how well the agent’s abilities match the requirements
of the task he is assigned. Let v(x, θ) denote the cost for the agent of producing x
units, where the parameter θ represents the match.4 The match may be either good
(θ = θ) or bad (θ = θ¯ ), with the probability of a bad match being α ∈ (0, 1). The
cost function v is strictly increasing and strictly convex in x , with v(0, θ) = 0.
Finally, when the match is good, the production cost incurred by the agent is smaller
than when it is bad, for any output level: ∀x > 0, v′(x, θ¯ ) > v′(x, θ) (the prime
indicates a partial derivative with respect to x). This is the standard Spence–Mirr-
lees condition. The employee’s net surplus is the transfer net of the production cost
U (x, t, θ) = t − v(x, θ). The agent’s reservation utility is normalized to zero; we
assume that the agent may quit at any time. For further reference, the first-best
values of x , x¯∗ if θ = θ¯ and x∗ if θ = θ , are defined by π ′(x¯∗) = v′(x¯∗, θ¯ ) and
π ′(x∗) = v′(x∗, θ), respectively. Given the properties of π and v, they are uniquely
defined, and 0 < x¯∗ < x∗.5 We will call an output with its corresponding transfer
an allocation y = (x, t).
In the standard setting, the principal would discriminate between a good and a
bad match using a mechanism, to be at work in the second period.
Definition 1 (Mechanism) A mechanism m defines a space M2 of messages µ2
and a mapping ym : M2 → IR+ × IR+, where IR+ × IR+ is the set of feasible
allocations. A mechanism is said to be direct if the message space is the set of
matches, M2 = {θ, θ¯}; otherwise, it is indirect.
The principal faces an additional uncertainty, regarding the agent’s ethics, de-
noted k: independently of the match realization, with probability γ ∈ (0, 1), the
agent is dishonest (k = d), and with the complementary probability, he is honest
(k = h). All probability distributions are common knowledge. By contrast with
4 The results would not be substantially affected if we allowed for θ to directly affect the
principal’s surplus π (see further the discussion following Proposition 4); however, the notation
and some of the arguments used in the proofs would be more cumbersome.
5 Additional assumptions about functional forms would be needed to guarantee existence and
uniqueness of solutions in the incomplete information cases considered in the paper.
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the match realization which is revealed to the agent in period 2, the agent learns his
ethics in period 1, before any contract is signed. The agent’s ethics is his private
information. A dishonest agent always maximizes his surplus, like in any standard
principal-agent setting. By contrast, an honest agent may forego material benefits
to truthfully announce his match θ (at date 2). In order for him to feel committed to
truthful match revelation in period 2, it must be that all allowed messages specify
a match realization. If a mechanism specifies messages that are unrelated to the
true values of θ , telling the truth is a fuzzy notion and we might as well assume
that an honest agent would not be reluctant to announce such messages, so that
the principal could not gain anything by using them.6 We further assume that an
honest agent does not feel committed to revealing his match truthfully if there are
several messages specifying the same match realization.
With our specification of honesty, the contract offered in the first period may
be described as a menu of direct mechanisms:
Definition 2 (Contract) A contract C defines a space M1 of messages µ1 that
may be sent by the agent at date 1, and a mapping c : M1 → MD where MD is
the set of direct mechanisms m (see Definition 1).
The timing may be summarized as follows. In period 1, the agent learns his
ethics, the principal then offers a contract, and finally the agent selects a message
in M1. This message determines which direct mechanism will be used in period
2. In period 2, the agent learns his match, and chooses a message in {θ, θ¯}, and the
associated allocation is carried out.
Formally, honesty is equivalent to the following restriction on the message
space at date 2:
Assumption 1 (Ethics I) (Messages at date 2)
(i) A dishonest may announce any θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}.
(ii) An honest with match θ ∈ {θ, θ¯} must announce θ if a contract was signed
at date 1; otherwise, he may announce any θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}.
Since no contract has been signed prior to date 1 an honest agent does not feel
committed to revealing his ethics. Formally, we have the following assumption
Assumption 2 (Ethics II) Whether the agent is honest or dishonest, he may an-
nounce any µ1 ∈ M1.
For further use below, let θˆ∗(θ, k, m) denote the agent’s best response in mech-
anism m if his match is θ , and µ∗1(k) the best response at date 1. As a tie-breaking
rule, we assume that whenever an agent is indifferent between revealing the truth
and lying, he reveals the truth.
As we argue in our companion paper Alger and Renault (2006), this analy-
sis could be phrased in more general terms by allowing for messages that do not
necessarily spell out a match realization. What is critical is that for each match
realization an honest agent is restricted to a subset of messages, where subsets
6 This is related to the idea that honest behavior may be linked to a fear of being found out
lying. In many cases, one can argue that the value of θ is verifiable information, albeit at a very
high cost; a potentially honest agent may underestimate that cost. But if the honest agent sends
the message “blue” for instance, there is no information to be verified.
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associated with different matches do not intersect. Here it is assumed that an hon-
est behavior is guaranteed only if at most one allocation is associated with each
subset, and no allocation is associated with a message outside these restricted sets.
By contrast, in Deneckere and Severinov (2001) honest behavior is ensured even
with mechanisms specifying allocations for messages that are out of reach of the
honest agent.7
As a benchmark we describe the optimal contracts if ethics were known. First,
if the principal faced an honest agent, she would implement the first-best decisions
and extract the whole surplus by offering a contract with one message leading to
the first-best mechanism:
Definition 3 (First-best mechanism) The first-best mechanism, denoted m∗, de-
fines M2 = {θ, θ¯}, and the mapping associating (x¯∗, t¯∗) to message µ2 = θ¯ , and
(x∗, t∗) to the message µ2 = θ , where t¯∗ = v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) and t∗ = v(x∗, θ).
If the agent is known to be dishonest, the revelation principle applies and
the mechanism that maximizes the principal’s expected surplus may be found by
imposing individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. This yields
the standard second-best mechanism (Definition 4).
Definition 4 (Standard second-best mechanism) The standard second-best mech-
anism, denoted ms , defines M2 = {θ, θ¯}, and the mapping associating (x¯ s, t¯ s) to
message µ2 = θ¯ , and (xs, t s) to message µ2 = θ , where
t¯ s = v(x¯ s, θ¯ ) t s = v(x∗, θ) + [v(x¯ s, θ¯ ) − v(x¯ s, θ)]
v′(x¯ s, θ¯ ) = π ′(x¯ s, θ¯ ) − 1 − α
α
[v′(x¯ s, θ¯ ) − v′(x¯ s, θ)], xs = x∗.
In equilibrium, the agent receives a rent if the match is good, and the allocation is
sub-optimal if the match is bad.
If ethics is the agent’s private information, and if the first-period menu offered
by the principal is comprised of the first-best and the standard second-best mecha-
nism, the agent always selects the wrong mechanism from the principal’s viewpoint.
This shows that the solution with complete information on ethics is not incentive
compatible in a very strong sense since both honest and dishonest agents would
deviate. We next turn to determining the optimal contract.
3 Analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
The standard approach to the present asymmetric information problem would rely
on the revelation principle, whereby for any contract there exists a direct incentive-
compatible contract that implements the same allocation in every state of nature.
7 Deneckere and Severinov (2001) use “password mechanisms” where the agent announces his
match together with the set of matches he could have announced, and they assume that an honest
agent may not lie about the set of matches he could have announced. Similar mechanisms are also
used in Forges and Koessler (2005) for communication equilibria with certifiable information.
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Here it is straightforward to prove that this principle does not hold. Consider the
following contract: (mh, md) = (m∗, m∗). In equilibrium, the honest agent reveals
θ truthfully and gets no rent. The dishonest agent always announces θ¯ ; he gets no
rent if θ = θ¯ , and the rent v(x¯∗, θ¯ )−v(x¯∗, θ) if θ = θ . According to the revelation
principle, there should exist a menu of direct mechanisms (m′h, m′d) yielding the
same allocations as the original ones in every state of nature, and inducing the
agent to tell the truth. Therefore, m′d must specify the allocation (x¯∗, t¯∗) whether
the agent announces θ or θ¯ . As a result, for the honest agent to reveal h truthfully,
m′h must give him an expected rent (1−α)[v(x¯∗, θ¯ )−v(x¯∗, θ)] > 0, which yields
a contradiction with the requirement that the allocation should be the same in every
state of nature, in which case the honest agent would get no rent. Hence the revela-
tion principle does not hold in our framework.8 At first sight, the task to determine
the optimal contract thus seems daunting. The following observation facilitates the
determination of the optimal contract.
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality, one may focus on contracts C that define the
message space M1 = {h, d} and that induce truth-telling at date 1, i.e, µ∗1(h, C) =
h and µ∗1(d, C) = d.
Lemma 1 implies that we may impose two date 1 incentive compatibility con-
straints ensuring that an honest agent announces h while a dishonest agent an-
nounces d . We may now use a lighter notation: a mechanism mk , where k ∈ {h, d},
specifies the allocation (xk, tk) if the date 2 message is θ , and (x¯k, t¯k) if the date 2
message is θ¯ . We will say that ethics screening occurs if md = mh .
Given that the equilibrium behavior of the agent is not known a priori, we
have to determine the contracts that are optimal conditional on assumed behavior,
before being able to determine the equilibrium contract. We start by analyzing
mechanisms that do induce truth-telling at date 2 by the dishonest agent, before
turning to mechanisms inducing lies.
3.2 Incentive-compatible contracts
Here we assume that in equilibrium a dishonest agent reveals θ at date 2:∀θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}
we have θˆ∗(θ, d, md) = θ . Thus the principal chooses the pair of mechanisms
{md , mh} = {{x¯d , t¯d , xd , td}, {x¯h, t¯h, xh, th}} so as to maximize:
γ [α(π(x¯d) − t¯d) + (1 − α)(π(xd) − td)]
+(1 − γ )[α(π(x¯h, θ¯ ) − t¯h) + (1 − α)(π(xh, θ) − th)].
8 This is similar, although not formally equivalent, to the result in Green and Laffont (1986)
that in a one-stage information revelation problem, when an agent’s message space is restricted,
the revelation principle may fail to apply. See Deneckere and Severinov (2001), Forges and
Koessler (2005), and Alger and Renault (2006) for further discussions of this issue in one-stage
models. Alger and Ma (2003) have the same informational and contractual structure as we do;
as a result this observation is true in their setting as well.
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For the agent to reveal his ethics at date 1, the following incentive compatibility
constraints must hold:
α[t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[th − v(xh, θ)]
≥ α[t¯d − v(x¯d , θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[td − v(xd , θ)] (1)
α[t¯d − v(x¯d , θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[td − v(xd , θ)]
≥ α max{t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ ), th − v(xh, θ¯ )}
+(1 − α) max{th − v(xh, θ), t¯h − v(x¯h, θ)} (2)
An honest agent reveals θ truthfully irrespectively of the mechanism chosen at
date 1. Therefore, the incentive constraint for the honest agent (1) is straightfor-
ward. In contrast, we do not know the dishonest agent’s behavior if he were to claim
to be honest at date 1: therefore, the right-hand side of constraint (2) is not based
on truth-telling. However, by assumption, the dishonest agent truthfully reveals θ
in equilibrium, yielding the expression on the left-hand side of the constraint. Sec-
ond, for the dishonest agent to reveal his match θ in equilibrium, the two following
incentive compatibility constraints must hold, but as is standard only the first one
binds:
td − v(xd , θ) ≥ t¯d − v(x¯d , θ) (3)
t¯d − v(x¯d , θ¯ ) ≥ td − v(xd , θ¯ ). (4)
Finally, the participation constraints are:
t¯k − v(x¯k, θ¯ ) ≥ 0 k = h, d (5)
tk − v(xk, θ) ≥ 0 k = h, d. (6)
The principal maximizes his expected utility subject to the constraints (1)-(6),
yielding:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the principal is restricted to contracts inducing the
dishonest to reveal his true θ . Then the optimal contract is to offer the standard
second-best mechanism independent of the announced ethics.
The intuition is as follows. The principal must give the dishonest agent a rent to
make him reveal θ at date 2. But since the honest agent behaves opportunistically
at date 1, she must give him the same rent. As a result, the optimal contract is as if
the agent were dishonest with certainty. Proposition 1 indicates that the only way to
leave a smaller rent to the honest than to the dishonest agent is to let the dishonest
agent manipulate the information at date 2.
3.3 Contracts inducing lies
From Lemma 1 we may without loss of generality impose date 1 incentive com-
patibility constraints, which ensure truthful ethics revelation. Which kind of sec-
ond period incentive compatibility constraints should be imposed, depends on the
assumed equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium behavior of the dishonest agent; the
exact formulation of all constraints also depends on this. Given that the dishonest
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lies in equilibrium we need to consider only two cases: the revealing lies case where
he always lies in equilibrium (the principal can then infer θ ), and the non-revealing
lies case where the dishonest agent’s equilibrium announcement is independent of
his match.
In the revealing lies case the dishonest lies systematically, by announcing θ¯
when the match is θ , and vice versa. The principal therefore chooses the pair of
mechanisms {md , mh} = {(x¯d , t¯d , xd , td), (x¯h, t¯h, xh, th)}, so as to maximize:
γ [α(π(xd) − td) + (1 − α)(π(x¯d) − t¯d)]
+(1 − γ )[α(π(x¯h) − t¯h) + (1 − α)(π(xh) − th)]. (7)
In the Appendix we show that both of the following ethics incentive compatibility
constraints are binding,
α[t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[th − v(xh, θ)]
≥ α max{t¯d − v(x¯d , θ¯ ), 0} + (1 − α) max{td − v(xd , θ), 0} (8)
α[td − v(xd , θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[t¯d − v(x¯d , θ)]
≥ α max{t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ ), th − v(xh, θ¯ )}
+(1 − α) max{t¯h − v(x¯h, θ), th − v(xh, θ)}, (9)
as are the participation constraints corresponding to a bad match, which is given
by (5) with k = h for an honest and by
td − v(xd , θ¯ ) ≥ 0 (10)
for a dishonest. Note that because of the tie-breaking rule that an agent who is
indifferent between lying and not lying tells the truth, the constraint ensuring that
the dishonest with a good match announces a bad match must hold as a strict
inequality:
t¯d − v(x¯d , θ) > td − v(xd , θ). (11)
Even though this constraint cannot be binding, it turns out to be relevant, because it
leads to non-existence of an optimal contract with revealing lies for some parameter
values, as is specified in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Revealing lies) Suppose that the principal is restricted to contracts
inducing the dishonest to always lie in equilibrium. Then, an optimal contract exists
only if γ < 1/2, in which case it is such that x¯ Rd = x Rh = x∗,
v′(x Rd , θ¯ ) = π ′(x Rd ) −
1 − γ
γ
1 − α
α
[v′(x Rd , θ¯ ) − v′(x Rd , θ)]
v′(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) = π ′(x¯ Rh ) −
γ
1 − γ
1 − α
α
[v′(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) − v′(x¯ Rh , θ)]
and
t Rd = v(x Rd , θ¯ ) t¯ Rd = v(x¯ Rd , θ) + [v(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) − v(x¯ Rh , θ)]
t¯ Rh = v(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) t Rh = v(x Rh , θ) + [v(x Rd , θ¯ ) − v(x Rd , θ)].
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For γ < 1/2 both the honest and the dishonest obtain a rent, however it is
lower for the honest thanks to the message reversal. Here the rent-efficiency trade-
off is implied by the ethics incentive compatibility constraints being binding. If a
dishonest claimed to be honest he would earn a rent by pretending that the match
is bad when it is good, while if an honest agent claimed to be dishonest he would
earn a rent by telling the truth when the match is good. Hence the rent of an honest
depends positively on xd , whereas that of a dishonest depends positively on x¯h .
This in turn implies that the quantities x¯h and xd are distorted downwards from x¯∗,
and depend on the probability that the agent is dishonest. Since for γ < 1/2 it is
more likely that the agent is honest, the downward distortion is more pronounced
for xd than for x¯h ; moreover, we have xd < x¯ s < x¯h , x¯h is decreasing and xd
increasing in γ , and both tend to x¯ s as γ tends to one half. For γ ≥ 1/2 the down-
ward distortion for xd would be less pronounced than for x¯h (with equality for
γ = 1/2). The rent of a dishonest agent with a good match being determined by x¯h
through the ethics incentive compatibility constraint, it would not be high enough
to prevent him from telling the truth and earn a rent that would be determined by
xd . In other words (11) would be violated.9
Since xd is increasing in γ , the honest agent’s rent falls as the probability that
the agent is dishonest becomes smaller. Furthermore, the mechanism intended for
the honest agent tends toward the first-best mechanism as that probability tends to
zero.
In the non-revealing lies case the principal chooses the contract that maxi-
mizes her expected surplus, given that the dishonest obtains the same allocation
independent of his match.
Proposition 3 (Non-revealing lies) Suppose that the principal is restricted to con-
tracts such that the dishonest obtains the same allocation (xd , td) independent of
his match. Then, in any optimal contract the honest agent obtains the first-best
mechanism, and (xd , td) = (x¯∗, v(x¯∗, θ¯ )). Furthermore, a dishonest agent always
announces θ¯ .
An obvious way to implement the optimal allocations is to offer the first-best
mechanism independent of ethics.10 It is critical that the dishonest agent should
announce a bad match in equilibrium. If instead the dishonest agent announced a
good match, the honest agent with a good match would derive a rent from the allo-
cation chosen by the dishonest, since that allocation must satisfy the participation
constraint for a bad match.
In any contract inducing lies, the optimal mechanism for an honest is such that
the dishonest agent would announce a bad match if he were to choose that mecha-
nism. It would clearly not be optimal to design mh so as to induce the dishonest to
reveal θ truthfully, as that would simply bring us back to the incentive-compatible
case. It is also intuitive that the principal should not specify mh so that a dishonest
9 The non-existence for γ ≥ 1/2 is therefore due to the tie-breaking rule that the agent
announces the truth if indifferent. For γ ≥ 1/2, if this tie-breaking rule were not imposed, it
can be shown that the optimal contract would implement the standard second-best allocations
for both honest and dishonest agents. However, with the standard second-best allocations, the
dishonest with a good match is indifferent between the two allocations specified in md so that
with the tie-breaking rule he would announce a good match.
10 The allocation corresponding to a good match for the dishonest is in fact indeterminate, since
it is never chosen in equilibrium.
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with match θ¯ would announce θ in mh ; then there would be no benefit to screening
matches for honest agents, since an agent with a good match should be paid as
much as an agent with a bad match for a given output.
3.4 The equilibrium contract
Having determined the contracts that are optimal conditional on the three relevant
message structures, we can characterize the unconditional equilibrium. The stan-
dard second-best and revealing-lies contracts together define the largest surplus
that the principal can achieve while screening matches for the dishonest: only the
former is relevant for γ ≥ 12 , while the latter is preferred otherwise. Hence to derive
the equilibrium contract we need to compare this surplus with that obtained with
the first-best contract. Figure 1, where the two relevant surpluses (first-best and
match screening) are drawn as a function of γ , depicts the three situations that may
arise. We show in the proof of Proposition 4 that the surplus curves are as shown
in the picture (S denotes the surplus with the standard second-best contract, R
the surplus derived from the revealing lies contract, and ∗ the surplus associated
to the first-best contract).






γγ ∗ 12 1
∗
R
S
a






γγ ∗∗γ ∗ 12 1
∗
R
S
b


γ1
2 γ
∗ 1
∗
R S
c
Fig. 1 a Case 1 in Proposition 4. b Case 2 in Proposition 4. c Case 3 in Proposition 4
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In panel (a) the first-best surplus curve always lies beneath the match screen-
ing surplus curve, so that the equilibrium contract is whichever match screening
contract is relevant. As we will see in the proposition below, this occurs when the
probability α of a bad match is small. Intuitively this makes sense, since resort-
ing to the first-best contract is costly only when the match is good. By contrast,
when this probability is large, offering the first-best contract is always optimal
when dishonesty is sufficiently unlikely, as shown in panels (b) and (c). Then the
equilibrium contract depends on whether the first-best surplus crosses the second-
best surplus below or above γ = 12 . In the former case, the revealing lies contract
is optimal for intermediate values of γ (panel b), whereas in the latter case it is
never optimal (panel c). In the proof of the following proposition we show that
there exists a unique threshold value γ ∗ such that the second-best dominates the
first-best contract if and only if γ > γ ∗; we also find that γ ∗ is strictly increasing
in α, the probability of a bad match, and that it is bounded above by
γˆ ≡ v(x¯
∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)
[π(x∗) − v(x∗, θ)] − [π(x¯∗) − v(x¯∗, θ¯ )] < 1. (12)
Proposition 4 There exists a unique α1 ∈ (0, 1) and a unique α2 ∈ (α1, 1] such
that:
1. If α ≤ α1: the principal offers the incentive-compatible contract if γ ≥ 1/2,
and the revealing-lies contract otherwise.
2. If α ∈ [α1, α2), there exists a unique γ ∗∗(α) ∈ (0, 1/2) such that the prin-
cipal offers the incentive-compatible contract if γ ≥ 1/2, the revealing-lies
contract if γ ∈ [γ ∗∗, 1/2), and the non-revealing lies contract if γ < γ ∗∗.
3. If α ≥ α2, there exists a unique γ ∗(α) ∈ (1/2, 1) such that the principal
offers the incentive-compatible contract if γ ≥ γ ∗, and the non-revealing
lies contract otherwise.
These results are visualized in Figure 2.11
If α < α1, the benefits of screening matches for the dishonest are so large that
the honest receives a positive rent for any value of the probability γ that the agent is
dishonest: the principal offers the standard second-best contract if γ ≥ 1/2, and the
revealing-lies contract otherwise. For intermediary values of α, the benefits from
screening matches for the dishonest are smaller; therefore, when γ is sufficiently
small the principal forgoes them altogether and leaves no rent to the honest, by
offering the first-best contract. However, ethics screening then still occurs for inter-
mediary values of γ , and the standard second-best contract is offered whenever
dishonesty is more likely than honesty. As α increases beyond α2, though, the
benefits from leaving no rent to an honest outweigh the benefits from screening
matches for a dishonest even if dishonesty is more likely than honesty (γ ∗ ≥ 1/2):
then, ethics screening does not occur at all, since the principal switches from
the first-best to the standard second-best contract as the probability of dishonesty
increases.
11 In the figure we have assumed that γ ∗∗ is a monotonic function of α, and that both γ ∗ and
γ ∗∗ are linear in α.
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Fig. 2 The optimal contract
Surpluses are affected in intuitive ways. Both the principal and the dishonest
agent gain from the presence of honest agents if and only if the probability of hon-
esty rises above the threshold at which the principal drops the standard second-best
contract. Whereas the surplus of the principal increases in a continuous manner
(see Fig. 1), it involves some discontinuities for the opportunistic agent whenever
the principal switches to the first-best contract. By contrast, an honest is penalized
by an increase in the likelihood of honesty. In the second-best contract he is treated
as well as a dishonest agent, but otherwise he receives a smaller or no rent; if he
receives a rent, which is the case in a revealing lies contract, it is decreasing in the
likelihood of honesty.
Our results indicate that ruling out ethics screening altogether as in most of
the previous literature implies a loss of generality. Here ethics screening arises
whenever the principal finds it optimal to use the revealing lies contract. This
contract allows the principal to screen among matches for dishonest agents while
leaving a smaller rent to the honest than with the second-best contract. In Alger and
Renault (2006) we also find that ethics screening may arise, although it requires
that there be more than two match realizations. There we study ethics screening
when honest behavior is conditional on the fairness of the contract. There is only
one period and the principal attempts to simultaneously screen both ethics and
matches. The honest behaves honestly only if he expects a low enough probability
that a dishonest misrepresents his match in equilibrium. The allocations in the opti-
mal revealing lies contract of Proposition 2 would not be acceptable for an honest
agent with fairness concerns: this is because there are two allocations associated
with claims that the match is bad that yield different surpluses for an agent whose
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match is indeed bad. The allocation yielding the lower surplus would therefore only
be chosen by a dishonest agent misrepresenting his match. Thus, with two matches
the ability of the principal to screen ethics is greater when honesty is conditional
on commitment than when it is conditional on fairness.12
Alger and Ma (2003) also find that ethics screening is optimal: they actually find
that it is always optimal whenever honesty is sufficiently likely. In their model an
insurer (the principal) contracts with a patient and a physician in the first period. A
contract specifies the amount of treatment (the decision in our model) and transfers
from the patient to the insurer as well as from the insurer to the physician. In the
second period, the physician submits a claim to the insurer about the patient’s health
state; if the physician is opportunistic, he may collude with the patient against the
insurer by submitting a false claim. In their setup an exogenous restriction on the
contract effectively rules out the possibility of using a revealing-lies contract.13 As
a result, it is clearly the non-revealing lies contract which is optimal whenever γ
is sufficiently small. By contrast with our model, the non-revealing lies contract
involves ethics screening; furthermore, it never specifies the first-best decision,
even for an honest physician. This is due to the insurance motive: the risk aversion
of the patient makes it optimal to reduce the difference between the allocations
associated with an honest and an opportunistic physician.
Another difference is that, using our notation, in their model the principal’s sur-
plus π is directly affected by the match θ . Since in their model the insurance market
is competitive, the principal’s objective is to maximize the patient’s expected utility.
As a result, even if the physician always claims that the patient is ill, the objective
function still mirrors the fact that the patient is healthy with some probability. We
analyzed a version of the present model where the match affects the principal’s sur-
plus directly and found that qualitatively, the results are the same as here, except
for the decision x specified for an opportunistic agent in the non-revealing lies
contract: this decision would then be an increasing function of the probability that
the match is good, and it would be equal to x¯∗ (as here) only if that probability is
zero. However, and this clearly points out the role played by risk aversion in Alger
and Ma, the principal would still offer the first-best contract to an honest agent.
4 Concluding remarks
As we saw in the Introduction, modern psychology has taught us that it would not
be appropriate to view honesty as an unrestrained desire to reveal hidden informa-
tion. Rather, it should be dependent upon conditions under which the individual
12 Nevertheless, the revealing lies contract is a bit unsettling. In a workplace context, if an hon-
est agent were to choose the mechanism meant for the dishonest, he would be asked to commit
to producing more with a bad than with a good match. It is questionable whether an honest agent
would feel compelled to commit to such an absurd scheme. But maybe more importantly, the
ability of the principal to commit to this type of mechanism strongly depends upon her expec-
tation that no honest agent would ever select it; if she assigned a positive probability to such an
event, she would have an incentive to renegotiate and offer the standard second-best mechanism
instead. This would be accepted by an honest agent since his surplus is larger than what he would
obtain by telling the truth in the original mechanism.
13 The amount of treatment is assumed to be nil whenever the physician claims that the patient
is healthy. Hence, if the physician and patient prefer to claim that the patient is ill when in fact
he is healthy, they also prefer that claim when the patient is ill.
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is led to choose whether to give up the benefits of an opportunistic behavior. Here
we have focused on the role of loyalty in inducing honesty. Ex ante opportunistic
behavior regarding ethics revelation enables an honest agent to sometimes garner
a rent which would be denied to him if honesty was unconditional. It also implies
that the principal must let the dishonest misrepresent matches if she wants to leave
a smaller rent to an honest than to an opportunistic agent. As in Alger and Ma
(2003) who use an information structure similar to ours, we find that the principal
may choose to screen ethics. However, in contrast with their results, we find that
ethics screening is not used if the match between the agent and the task is likely
to be bad. Still the potential for screening ethics is greater in the present setup
than in Alger and Renault (2006). When honesty is conditional on fairness ethics
screening occurs only if there are more than two match realizations.
The results in our companion paper (Alger and Renault 2006) pertaining to sit-
uations with more than two matches suggest that increasing the number of match
realizations enhances the principal’s ability to screen on the basis of ethics. We
expect that this would be the case here as well. Furthermore, introducing a larger
set of matches may mitigate our result that the standard analysis, where the agent
is assumed to be opportunistic with certainty, is robust to the introduction of honest
agents. In our companion paper with three match realizations if the intermediate
match is sufficiently close to the best match, the standard second-best contract
would not be optimal even if honesty is very unlikely.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 For the purpose of this proof, let y denote an allocation (x, t).
There is no loss of generality in assuming participation at date 2, since no partici-
pation is equivalent to the allocation (0, 0).
Consider some contract which associates a direct mechanism to each message
µ1, through the function m. Now, consider another contract, in which the message
space at date 1 is {h, d}. Let kˆ denote the message sent at date 1 in this contract. To
each kˆ, the contract associates a direct mechanism through the function m˜. Each
mechanism m˜(kˆ) in turn defines an allocation y˜ to each message θˆ ∈ {θ, θ¯} sent
by the agent at date 2, through the function y˜m˜ . Let this function be such that:
y˜
m˜(kˆ)(θˆ ) = ym(µ∗1(kˆ))(θˆ ) ∀kˆ, ∀θˆ .
This implies that:
θˆ∗(θ, kˆ, m˜(kˆ)) = θˆ∗(θ, kˆ, m(µ∗1(kˆ))) ∀kˆ, ∀θ.
Then, we can show that truth-telling at date 1 is an equilibrium of the new mecha-
nism, by applying the standard technique.
Proof of Proposition 1 Add constraints (1) and (2) to get:
α[t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[th − v(xh, θ)]
≥ α max{t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ ), th − v(xh, θ¯ )}
+(1 − α) max{th − v(xh, θ), t¯h − v(x¯h, θ)}
Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
This implies that the following constraints must hold:
t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ ) ≥ th − v(xh, θ¯ ) (13)
th − v(xh, θ) ≥ t¯h − v(x¯h, θ) (14)
We can add these two constraints to the program, since they are implied by con-
straints (1) and (2). Let us now omit constraints (1) and (2), and find the solution to
the relaxed program: maximize the expected utility subject to the constraints (3)–
(6), (13), and (14). By inspection, we note that we can split this program into the fol-
lowing two programs: for k = d and k = h, respectively, find mk = {x¯k, t¯k, xk, tk}
so as to maximize α(π(x¯k, θ¯ ) − t¯k) + (1 − α)(π(xk, θ) − tk), subject to the con-
straint (3) and the relevant part of constraints (5) and (6) for k = d , and subject to
the constraints (13), (14) and the relevant part of constraints (5) and (6) for k = h.
These programs are identical in structure, and therefore have the same solution,
so that mh = md . The omitted constraints (1) and (2) are satisfied. The solu-
tion is then trivial, since the maximization problem is well-known from standard
principal-agent models.
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider the relaxed program where the expected surplus
of the principal is maximized subject to individual rationality constraints (5) with
k = h and (10), as well as
α[t¯h − v(x¯h, θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[th − v(xh, θ)] ≥ (1 − α)[td − v(xd , θ)], (8′)
which is implied by the honest agent’s ethics incentive constraint (8), and
α[td − v(xd , θ¯ )] + (1 − α)[t¯d − v(x¯d , θ)] ≥ t¯h − αv(x¯h, θ¯ ) − (1 − α)v(x¯h, θ),(9′)
which is implied by the dishonest agent’s ethics incentive constraint (9). We check
ex post that the solution to the relaxed program satisfies (8) and (9) as well as all
other omitted constraints.
We prove that the ethics incentive constraints (8′) and (9′) are binding. First,
if (8′) were slack, the principal could increase her expected surplus by decreasing
th (since we have omitted the participation constraint for the honest with a good
match). Similarly, if (9′) were slack, the principal could increase her surplus by
decreasing t¯d .
We now show that the individual rationality constraint (5) for k = h is binding.
Suppose that it were not binding. Then the principal should decrease t¯h and increase
th so as to keep the expected transfer unchanged; this decreases the right-hand side
of (9′) implying that the principal may decrease t¯d .
We now show that the individual rationality constraint (10) is binding. If it
were not binding, the principal should decrease td and increase t¯d so as to keep the
expected transfer unchanged; this decreases the right-hand side of (8′) implying
that the principal may decrease th .
The transfers are therefore as in the proposition; replacing them in the objective
function and taking first-order conditions yields the quantities in the proposition.
It is easy to verify that this solution satisfies the omitted constraints other than
(11) for all the parameter values. In particular, given the specified allocations the
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out-of-equilibrium behavior of the agent would be such that the ethics incentive
compatibility constraints (8) and (9) could be written as (8′) and (9′).
Constraint (11), however, is satisfied if and only if γ < 12 . Because the con-
straint (11) may not be binding any optimal contract must be the solution to a
program where it has been ignored: this solution is precisely the one described in
the proposition. Hence, whenever the solution does not satisfy the constraint, there
is no optimal contract. Note that in this case the set of revealing lies contracts is
not a closed subset of IR8, and is therefore not compact; this is the source of the
non-existence result.
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider the program where the principal chooses (xd , td),
(xh, th), and (x¯h, t¯h) so as to maximize
γ [π(xd) − td ] + (1 − γ )[α(π(x¯h) − t¯h) + (1 − α)(π(xh) − th)],
subject to participation constraints for the honest agent, and the participation con-
straint for the dishonest agent with match θ¯ :
td − v(xd , θ¯ ) ≥ 0.
The solution to this program yields an upper bound on what can be achieved
if only one allocation is implemented for a dishonest. It involves binding all the
participation constraints, and setting xd = x¯h = x¯∗ and xh = x∗. Besides (xd , td),
the mechanism meant for the dishonest agent specifies another allocation; that allo-
cation does not affect the principal’s expected surplus as long as it is not chosen
by the dishonest over (xd , td). For instance it may be the allocation (x∗, v(x∗, θ)).
This solution satisfies the omitted ethics incentive compatibility constraints if
and only if (xd , td) is associated to message θ¯ .
Proof of Proposition 4 Let S(α, γ ), ∗(α, γ ), and R(α, γ ) denote the princi-
pal’s expected surplus given the optimal incentive-compatible, non-revealing lies,
and revealing lies contracts, respectively. Letting S(x, θ) = π(x)−v(x, θ) denote
total surplus at x given match θ , we have:
S(α, γ ) = αS(x¯ s, θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x∗, θ) − (1 − α)[v(x¯ s, θ¯ ) − v(x¯ s, θ)]
∗(α, γ ) = γ [αS(x¯∗, θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x¯∗, θ) − (1 − α)[v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)]]
+(1 − γ )[αS(x¯∗, θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x∗, θ)]
R(α, γ ) = γ
[
αS(x Rd , θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x∗, θ) − (1 − α)[v(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) − v(x¯ Rh , θ)]
]
+(1 − γ )
[
αS(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x∗, θ)
−(1 − α)[v(x Rd , θ¯ ) − v(x Rd , θ)]
]
.
First, note that S is constant in γ . Second, ∗ is linear in γ ; the slope is equal
to
[
αS(x¯∗, θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x¯∗, θ) − (1 − α)[v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)]]
−[αS(x¯∗, θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x∗, θ)],
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which is strictly negative. Finally consider R . By the envelope theorem:
∂R
∂γ
= (1 − α)
[
[v(x Rd , θ¯ ) − v(x Rd , θ)] − [v(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) − v(x¯ Rh , θ)]
]
+α[S(x Rd , θ¯ ) − S(x¯ Rh , θ¯ )].
Here we assume that γ < 12 , since otherwise there is no optimal revealing lies
contract. Thus, x Rd < x¯
R
h < x¯
∗; moreover, x Rd and x¯ Rh tend to x¯ s as γ tends to
1
2 .
Therefore the above expression is strictly negative for γ < 12 and it tends to zero
as γ tends to 12 . Furthermore, x
R
d is increasing in γ while x¯
R
h is decreasing in γ .
Therefore S(x Rd , θ¯ )− S(x¯ Rh , θ¯ ) is strictly increasing in γ , and the term multiplying
1 − α is also increasing in γ . Therefore R is a strictly decreasing and strictly
convex function of γ .
A second step is to note a few relations between the expressions S , ∗ and
R , and their implications. First, R tends to S as γ tends to 12 . Together with
the above, this implies that R > S for γ < 12 . Second, 
∗ is equal to the
first-best principal’s surplus for as γ tends to 0, and falls below the second-best
expected surplus S as γ tends to 1 (because the second-best mechanism is opti-
mal for γ = 1). Together with the above, this means that for every α, there is a
unique γ ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∗ = S , above which ∗ < S and below which
∗ > S . Finally, note that limγ→0 ∗ = limγ→0 R .
We now show that the three cases of the proposition may arise. Since ∗ is
decreasing and linear in γ , whereas R is decreasing and convex in γ , a necessary
and sufficient condition for the non-revealing lies contract to be optimal for some
values of γ is that ∗ be less steep than R for γ close to 0. Since we only need
to compare ∂
∗
∂γ
and ∂R
∂γ
for γ close to 0, we compare ∂∗
∂γ
to:
lim
γ→0
∂R
∂γ
= −(1 − α)[v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)] − αS(x¯∗, θ¯ ).
∗ is less steep than R for γ close to 0 if ∂∗
∂γ
> limγ→0 ∂
R
∂γ
, i.e., if:
αS(x¯∗, θ¯ ) + (1 − α)S(x¯∗, θ) + (1 − α)[v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)]
−(1 − α)S(x∗, θ) − (1 − α)[v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)] > 0
It is easy to verify that this holds for α close to 1, but not for α close to 0. We now
check whether the left-hand side is monotonic in α, so that there exists a unique
threshold value α1 such that the left-hand side is equal to zero. The inequality may
be written:
S(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − (1 − α)S(x∗, θ) + (1 − α)[v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)] > 0.
The derivative of the left-hand side with respect to α is positive if
S(x∗, θ) − [v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)] > 0,
or, equivalently, if:
S(x∗, θ) + π(x¯∗) − v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) > π(x¯∗) − v(x¯∗, θ).
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Fig. 3 Monotonicity of γ ∗
This is true since the right-hand side is smaller than S(x∗, θ), by the definition of
x∗.
To show that there exists a unique α2 as specified in the proposition, it is suffi-
cient to show that γ ∗ is strictly increasing in α. First note that γ ∗ tends to 0 as α
tends to 0, and that
lim
α→1 γ
∗ ≡ γˆ = v(x¯
∗, θ¯ ) − v(x¯∗, θ)
[π(x∗) − v(x∗, θ)] − [π(x¯∗) − v(x¯∗, θ¯ )] ,
which is strictly positive. Therefore it is sufficient to show that γ ∗ is an invertible
function mapping (0, 1) onto (0, γˆ ), with the inverse being strictly increasing. To
this end we show that for every γ ∈ (0, γˆ ) there exists a unique α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that S > ∗ for α < α∗, and S < ∗ for α > α∗, and that α∗ is strictly
increasing in γ (the arguments for the proof are illustrated in Fig. 3).
Ceteris paribus, S and ∗ are decreasing in α:
∂∗
∂α
= (1 − γ )[π(x¯∗) − v(x¯∗, θ¯ ) − π(x∗) + v(x∗, θ)] < 0,
∂S
∂α
= π(x¯ s) − v(x¯ s, θ) − π(x∗) + v(x∗, θ) < 0,
where the second expression is derived using the envelope theorem. Moreover, ∗
is linear, whereas S is convex:
∂2S
∂α2
= [π ′(x¯ s) − v′(x¯ s, θ¯ ) + v′(x¯ s, θ¯ ) − v′(x¯ s, θ)]∂ x¯
s(α)
∂α
.
This is positive since both terms are positive (x¯ s being smaller than x¯∗). Fur-
thermore, for any γ ∈ (0, 1), limα→0 S(α, γ ) > limα→0 ∗(α, γ ), whereas
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limα→1 S(α, γ ) = limα→1 ∗(α, γ ). Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition
for there to exist a unique α∗, is that
lim
α→1
∂S
∂α
> lim
α→1
∂∗
∂α
,
which reduces to γ < γˆ . Finally, since S is constant in γ for any value of α,
whereas ∗ is decreasing, α∗ is strictly increasing.
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